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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) .
The "Order, Ruling and Judgment" appealed from was
entered on March 8, 1990. The appellants' Notice of Appeal was
filed on April 3, 1990.
V.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Are the subdividers' claims barred by a statute

of limitations.
a)

Sub issues are:

Were the subdividers required to file a notice
of claim within 90 days after they paid the fees
pursuant to a void ordinance?

b)

If so, did they file a notice of claim?

c)

Which, if any, statute of limitations applies
when a subdivider challenges a void ordinance or
assessment?

d)

Did the trial court err in failing to toll any
applicable

statute

of

limitations

until

the

Utah Supreme Court issued a final decision on
the

issue

of

class

litigation?
1

certification

in related

e)

Did the lower court err in failing to toll any
applicable

statute

of

limitations

under

the

doctrine of equitable tolling?
2.
a refund.

Are the subdividers entitled to a judgment for a

Sub issues are:
a)

Was West Jordan collaterally estopped by the
previous Call v. West Jordan litigation from
raising

the

affirmative

defenses

of mistake,

estoppel, waiver, laches and unjust enrichment?
b)

Are

the

affirmative

defenses

of

mistake,

estoppel, waiver, laches and unjust enrichment
unavailable to a municipality in an action for
recovery of money paid under a void ordinance?
Each of the issues presented for review is a question
of law with no deference given to the trial court.
Authority

for the notice of claim and statute of

limitations issue follows:

Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines

Co., 269 P.2d 867 (Utah 1954); Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership
v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District, 738 P.2d 633
(Utah 1987); El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp.,
565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462
U.S. 345 (1983).

2

Supporting authority on the collateral estoppel issue
is Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982).
Supporting authority showing whether West Jordan's
affirmative defenses are meritless is a question of law is: El
Rancho, supra; Port of Peninsula v. Bendiksen, 429 P.2d 859,
861 (Wash. 1967); Parente v. Day, 241 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ohio
App. 1968).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The

determinative,

constitutional

provisions,

statutes, ordinances, rule and regulations are set forth in the
appendix to this brief.

They are:

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25;
Utah Const, art. I § 11;
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third
Judicial

District

Court, of Salt Lake County, Utah.

judgment granted the City of West Jordan's
Partial

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

on

The

("West Jordan")
its

statute

of

limitations defense and denied appellants' Cross Motion for
3

Summary

Judgment

on

West

Jordan's

statute

defense and other City affirmative defenses.

of

limitations

The trial court's

ruling dismissed appellants' complaint against West Jordan.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
West Jordan adopted City Ordinance No. 33 requiring
subdividers to dedicate 7% of their land to the City or pay an
equivalent impact fee as a condition for subdivision approval.
(R. 2, 3, 9-11, 143, 144, 193.)
Thereafter,

the

appellants

(hereinafter

"sub-

dividers") paid money to West Jordan, under the ordinance, as
follows:
Subdivider

Date of Dedication
or Payment

Property or Money Paid

American Tierra Corp.
Arnold Development, Co.
Brighton Builders, Inc.
R & D Engineers, Inc.

$45,844.00
64,150.00
13,421.25
13,235.00

August 1978
1978
August. 1978
June 1975

(R. 2-3, 9-11, 131, 143-144.)
Subsequently, Robert J. DeBry, attorney at law, sent
a letter to the West Jordan Mayor and City Council on behalf of
subdividers,
similarly

John

Call,

Clark

Jenkins

situated" who had been required

dedicate property under the Ordinance.
4

and

"all

others

to pay money or

The letter was sent

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-11,
Code Ann. § 63-30-2 et seq.

the predecessor to Utah

The Notice of Claim demanded that

all the land and cash be returned to the subdividers.
207, 208.)

(R.

The City of West Jordan received the letter but

refused to return the cash and property to the subdividers.
On or about February 1,

1978, DeBry filed a class

action Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court against
the City for the return of the impact fees.

The action was

entitled "John Call and Clark Jenkins v. City of West Jordan"
filed in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. C78-829.
(R. 211-217.)

The Complaint designated

the class as "all

persons, partnerships, businesses, and corporations who have or
will

be

required

to either

dedicate

to West Jordan seven

percent (7%) of the land area of the proposed subdivisions or
pay the equivalent value in cash as required by Ordinance No.
33 as amended."

(R. 211-217.)

A copy of the ordinance is

attached in the appendix.
After three appeals of lower court rulings, the Utah
Supreme Court in Call v. West Jordan, 727 P. 2d 180 (Utah 1986)
("Call III") ruled in favor of subdividers Call and Jenkins and
against West Jordan.

This Court declared

ordinance void ab initio.

the West Jordan

However, in Call III, the Utah

Supreme Court upheld that part of the trial court's ruling
5

which denied class action status.

Call III, at 183.

The Call III decision was issued on July 23, 1986.
Rehearing on the class action issue was denied on October 29,
1986.

Call III, at 180.
Upon remand, West Jordan was allowed to amend its

answer

to

set

forth

the

affirmative

defenses

estoppel, waiver, laches and unjust enrichment.

of mistake,
(R. 156-169,

172-178.)
Subsequently,
Jenkins

a

interest.

judgment

the

for

trial

a refund

court
of

the

awarded

Call

impact

and

fees plus

The judgment was entered on November 5, 1987.

(R.

179-183.)
The

Complaints

of

American

Tierra

Corp., Arnold

Development Co., Covecrest Properties and Brighton Builders,
Inc. were filed on November 24, 1987.

R & D

Engineers, Inc.

filed its Complaint on July 18, 1988.

Each Complaint alleges

that the impact fee ordinance is void and demands a refund of
impact

fees

paid

to

West

Jordan.

(R.

2-3,

Civil

Nos.

870907679, 870907680, 870907681, 870907602, 880904700.)
The cases were consolidated into this one action by
an order of the court on August 26, 1988. (R. 20-22.)
West

Jordan

moved

for

partial

summary

judgment

claiming that the plaintiffs' complaints were barred by Utah
6

Code Ann. § 10-7-77 which required a notice of claim; as well
as three statutes of limitations: Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-78, 633-13 and 63-30-15.

(R. 127-128, 130-141.)

The subdividers

filed a Cross Motion

for Summary

Judgment contending that the claims were brought within any
applicable statute of limitations.
filed

a

Motion

for

Summary

(R. 190, 191.)

Judgment

contending

They also
that West

Jordan's affirmative defenses, as a matter of law, are without
merit and that they were entitled to a refund of fees paid to
West Jordan.

(R. 184-184.)

The trial court denied the subdividers motions and
entered an order on March
Motion

for

Partial

8, 1990, granting West Jordan's

Summary

subdividers' Complaints.

Judgment

and

(R. 323, 340-341.)

filed a Notice of Appeal on April 3, 1990.

dismissing

the

The subdividers

(R. 346-348.)

IX.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE A NOTICE
OF CLAIM WITH WEST JORDAN BECAUSE THEIR
CLAIMS ARE EQUITABLE CLAIMS
When a city collects a fee without authority to do
so, it has an equitable duty to refund the fee.

El Rancho

Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah
7

1977).

The claim for a refund is an equitable claim not barred

by the Utah Governmental Immunity Actf nor the notice of claim
statute.

Id.
In Call III, this Court ruled that West Jordan did

not have the authority to take the subdividers' money.
subdividers brought this action for a refund.

The

Their claims are

equitable claims not barred by the notice of claim statute.

POINT II
THE SUBDIVIDERS COMPLIED WITH ANY STATUTORY
NOTICE OF CLAIMS REQUIREMENT
The predecessor to this action was the Call v. West
Jordan litigation.

Call was filed as a class action.

The

subdividers in this case were part of the class.
Prior to the Call litigation, Robert J. DeBry filed a
letter

of

notice

of

claim

on

behalf

including the appellants in this case.

of

all

subdividers

A copy of this letter

is attached in the Appendix.
The notice of claim is legally sufficient.

Scar-

borough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975);
San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1974).

8

POINT III
NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE SUBDIVIDERS
CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN
In

Call III, this Court ruled that West Jordan's

impact fee ordinance was void ab initio.

A void legislative

act is of no effect and may be successfully attacked at any
time.

Swartout v. City of Spokane, 586 P.2d 135 (Wash. App.

1978).

Therefore, no statute of limitations bars an action for

a refund of a void fee or assessment.

Lake Worth Towers v.

Gerstung, 262 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972); Ratcliff v. City of Hurst,
593 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App. 1980).

POINT IV
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED UNTIL
THIS COURT RULED ON THE MOTION TO CERTIFY THE CALL
V. WEST JORDAN LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION
The predecessor to this litigaiton is the Call v.
West

Jordan

subdividers

litigation
in

this

filed

as

litigation

a

were

class

action..

designated

as

The
class

members.
Inherent

in

a

class

action

suit

is

always

the

possibility that after the statute of limitations period in the
class claims has expired, the class will not be certified.
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F.Supp. 894
(D. Utah 1989).

The commencing of a class action, such as Call
9

v. West Jordan, tolls any applicable statute of limitaitons as
to all class members until the issue of class certification is
reached by the courts.

Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462

U.S. 345 (1983); American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538 (1974); Sinclair, supra.
The statute of limitations in this case was tolled
until July 23 or October 29, 1986, the date this Court denied
class action status to Call v. West Jordan.
action were brought within

The claims in this

12-26 months after this Court's

decision, well within any statute of limitations that can be
applied to the subdividers.
POINT V
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
A statute of limitations is not an absolute bar to a
claim.

To prevent injustice, courts apply the "doctrine of

equitable tolling."

The doctrine is used to toll the statute

of limitations pending the outcome of a similar or related
lawsuit.

Telegraphers v. Ry Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342

(1944); Collier v. City of Pasadena, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Cal.
App. 1983); Burnett v. New York, 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
The elements required for equitable tolling are: (1)
timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2)
10

lack of prejudice to the defendant; and

(3) good faith and

reasonable conduct by the plaintiffs in filing the subsequent
claims.

Collier,

litigation.

supra.

All

elements

exist

in

this

Thus, any applicable statute of limitations was

tolled until a final decision was issued by this Court in the
Call v. West Jordan litigation.
POINT VI
APPLYING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS A BAR TO THESE
SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIMS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS OF ACCESS
TO THE COURTS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
If this Court upholds the lower court's ruling that
the statute of limitations bars the subdividers' claims, it
will effectively re-weight the competing interests identified
in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d

670

(Utah 1985) and

overrule the Berry decision to the extent it applies to class
actions.

Open

whenever

a class

access
action

to

the

courts

lawsuit

is

will

be meaningless

filed, the statute of

limitations expires and class action certification is denied.
POINT VII
IF THERE IS A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE
TO THE SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIM, IT IS UTAH CODE ANN.
§78-12-25 (FOUR YEARS)
The subdividers do not concede that any statute of
limitations applies to their claims.
11

However, if a statute of

limitations does apply, it is clearly Utah Code Ann. § 78-1225, four years.

Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership v. Salt Lake

City Suburban Sanitary District, 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987).
Because the statute of limitations did not begin to
run until class action status was determined in Call v. West
Jordan, the subdividers in this action filed their lawsuit well
within the four year period.
POINT VIII
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR THE
IMPACT FEES THEY PAID
There is no dispute that the subdividers paid the
fees to West Jordan.

There is no dispute as to the amount.

There is no dispute that the West Jordan ordinance was void
from the beginning.
No
claim.

statute

Call III.
of

limitations

bars

the

subdividers'

The other affirmative defenses raised by West Jordan

are without legal merit.

Further, each affirmative defense was

raised in the Call v. West Jordan litigation.

West Jordan is

collaterally estopped from litigating the affirmative defenses
again.
For these reasons, the subdividers are entitled to
have a judgment entered for a refund of the fees they paid.
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X.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIMS AGAINST WEST JORDAN
ARE EQUITABLE CLAIMS UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT IS INAPPLICABLE AND THE SUBDIVIDERS
NEED NOT FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM
A.

Factual Background.
In

Call

III, this

Court

held

that

West

Jordan's

impact fee ordinance was void ab initio because the City, when
it adopted the ordinance, failed to comply with the hearing and
notice

requirements

set

Call III, at 183.

forth

in Utah

Code Ann. § 10-9-25.

This Court ruled that West Jordan did not

have the authority to take and keep the subdividers' money, and
remanded

the case

to enter

a

judgment

in favor of the two

subdividers, Call and Jenkins.
Subsequently, the subdividers in this case filed suit
against West Jordan.
contended

that

authority.

Jordan

had

taken

III ruling, they

their

money

without

They asked for a refund.
West

dismiss

West

Relying on the Call

the

Jordan

complaint

boldly
because

demanded

that

"NO NOTICE

the

trial

court

OF CLAIM FROM THE

INSTANT PLAINTIFF'S FOR REFUND OF THE MONIES PAID BY THEM, SAID
REFUND JUSTIFIED BY THE CITY'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO HOLD A PUBLIC
13

HEARING, WAS EVEN —

EVEN NOW, PRESENTED TO THE CITY." (R.

134. )
West Jordan said that Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-13 and
Section 10-7-77, as they existed in 1978, required the subdividers to file a notice of claim within 90 days after the
subdividers paid their money.
The lower court granted summary judgment against the
subdividers and ruled: "Plaintiff's failed to file 'notice of
claim' with the City of West Jordan within 90 days after their
cause of action arose."
B.

(R. 323.)

Legal Analysis.
Both sections 10-7-77 and 63-3-13 as they existed in

1975-1978 were a part of the of Governmental Immunity statutory
scheme.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1; El Rancho Enterprises, Inc.

v. Murray City Corporation, 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977).
In El Rancho, the plaintiffs, like the subdividers in
this case, brought suit for a refund of the fees and charges
collected by a city without authority to do so.
the fees were water fees.
control and park fees.
case,

argued

that

In El Rancho,

In this case, the fees are flood

In El Rancho, the City, as is in this

Section

10-7-77

barred

the

plaintiff's

claims because no notice of claim was filed by the plaintiffs.

14

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

held

that

governmental

immunity and the failure to file a notice of claim were not
defenses

to

the

plaintiff's

claims

based on equitable considerations.

because

the

claims

were

Id,

The court acknowledged that "the common law exception
to governmental

immunity from equitable claims has long been

recognized in this jurisdiction."

Jd. at 779.

v. Salt Lake County, 23 Utah 102, 63 P. 907

see, Auerbach
(1901); Wall v.

Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917).
The court then said the foregoing cases have not been
eroded by the passage of time or the enactment of the Utah
Governmental
Jenkins

v.

Immunity
Swan,

675

Act.

El

P.2d

1145

Rancho,
(Utah

at

1983);

7 80;

see

also,

Greenhalqh

v.

Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
After

establishing

that

equitable

claims

do

not

require a notice of claim, the Utah Supreme Court defined an
equitable claim as follows:
If the city obtain[s] the money of another
by mistake, or without authority of law, it
is her duty to refund it — not from any
contract
entered into by her on the
subject, but from the general obligation to
do justice which binds all persons whether
natural or artificial.
El Rancho, at 779
citing Auerbach. (Emphasis added.)
El Rancho is on all fours with this case.

In both

cases, the plaintiffs seek a refund of a City fee.

In both

15

cases, the City lacked authority to collect the fee.

In both

cases, the City argued that because no notice of claim was
filed the claims must be dismissed.

The court in El Rancho

ruled that the claims are equitable and no notice of claim need
be filed.

This Court should issue an identical ruling.
POINT II
THE SUBDIVIDERS COMPLIED WITH ANY STATUTORY
NOTICE OF CLAIMS REQUIREMENT

A.

Introduction.
The subdividers do not concede that they are required

to file a notice of claim with West Jordan, but if they are,
the record shows that a notice of claim was timely filed on
their behalf.
B.

Factual Background.
Prior to commencing the Call v. West Jordan class

action litigation, Robert J. DeBry sent a letter to the West
Jordan Mayor and City Council, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 6330-2 et seq.

West Jordan acknowledges it received the letter,

a copy of which is attached in the appendix.
The
Council.
and

letter

is

addressed

to

the

Mayor

and

City

It was sent on behalf of subdividers Call, Jenkins

all other

similarly

situated
16

subdividers.

The

letter

explains that West Jordan's ordinance is illegal and that West
Jordan cannot require the subdividers to dedicate land or pay
cash.

The letter demands that the land and cash be refunded to

all the subdividers.

Finally, the letter stresses that if the

land and cash are not returned, a class action on behalf of all
the subdividers will be filed seeking the return of the land
and the cash.
C.

Legal Analysis.
The purpose of a notice of claim

is to alert the

public authority, so that a proper and timely investigation of
the claim can be made.

e.g., Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah

2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192
(Utah 1977).

A legally sufficient notice of claim:

1.

is in writing;

2.

contains a statement of facts and describes the
nature of the claim;

3.

is signed by a claimant or an attorney;

4.

is directed to and delivered to someone authorized to respond.

Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah
1975) .
The DeBry letter notice of claim meets each of the
above elements.

It is in writing.
17

It contains a statement of

the facts upon which the claim is based and describes the
nature of the claim.

It is signed by an attorney and it was

sent and received by the Mayor and City Council of West Jordan.
West Jordan grumbles that the notice of claim does
not list the name of each subdivider.

However, when a class

action lawsuit is contemplated, the notice of claim need not
identify each member of the class.

The California Supreme

Court, in San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1974)
held that the requirements of the California notice of claim
statute were met when the notice identified the representative
plaintiffs and added sufficient information to identify and
ascertain the class itself.

In this case, the notice of claim

identified representatives of the class, Call and Jenkins, and
provided sufficient information to identify and ascertain the
class, i.e., all subdividers who paid impact fees, including
but not limited to, the subdividers in this action.
D.

Conclusion.
The appellants need not have filed a notice of claim

because

the

claim

immunity statute.

is

not

governed

by

Utah's

governmental

See Point I above; see, Cox v. Utah Mortgage

& Loan Co., 716 P.2d 783, 85-86 (Utah 1986).
Nevertheless,

DeBry's

applicable notice of claim statute.
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letter

complies

with

It is in writing.

any

It was

sent and received.

It describes the claim and it sets forth

what must be done to satisfy the claim.
POINT III
NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE SUBDIVIDERS'
CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN
In Call III, this court declared the West Jordan
Subdivision Fee Ordinance as void ab initio.

Id. at 186.

No

statute of limitations applies to the challenge of a void
ordinance or assessment.

Lake Worth Towers v. Gerstung, 262

So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
In Lake Worth Towers, the plaintiff challenged an
assessment.
statute

of

The

defendants

limitations

as

raised

the

a defense.

Florida
In ruling

six-month
that no

statute of limitations was a bar to plaintiff's claim, the
Florida Supreme Court explained:
The assessment in the instant case was
void. There was no statutory authority for
imposing the challenged full-faced assessment on the [plaintiff] property.
Because the assessment was illegal and
void, it was properly challenged, even
though the statute of limitations had run.
Id. at 4.
Similarly, in Ratcliff v. City of Hurst, 593 S.W.2d
863 (Tex. App. 1980), taxpayers sued the city for reimbursement
of taxes which, as in this case, prior litigation determined
19

were collected without lawful authority.
statute of limitations defense.

The city raised the

The trial court, on the basis

of the statute of limitations, ruled in favor of the city.
appeal, the decision was reversed.

On

The Texas Court of Appeals

ruled that the taxpayers could proceed with their lawsuit.

The

court said:
We reverse the trial court.
We render
judgment that no limitation statute is
proper to be applied and that the
plaintiffs are severally entitled to
recover judgment for the entire amount of
the taxes which they paid. . . .
Id. at 864.

see, Swartout v. City of Spokane, 586 P.2d 135

(Wash App. 1978).

(Generally, a void legislative act is of no

effect and may be successfully attacked at any time.)
In summary, West Jordan's ordinance was void from the
beginning.

The ordinance and the illegal assessment may be

successfully attacked at any time.
POINT IV
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED
UNTIL THIS COURT RULED ON THE MOTION TO CERTIFY
THE CALL V. WEST JORDAN LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION
A.

Introduction.
The subdividers do not concede that any statute of

limitaitons bars their claim, but if there is an applicable
statute of limitations, the statute of limitations is tolled
20

until the issue of class action status was finally resolved in
the related Call v. West Jordan litigation.
B.

Factual Background.
The

Call

v.

West

Jordan

case, the predecessor

to

these actions was filed as a class action on February 7, 1978.
The designated class was:
All persons partnerships, businesses and
corporations which have, or will be
required, to either dedicate seven percent
(7%) of the land area of their proposed
subdivision or the equivalent in cash to
the defendant in accordance with Ordinance
No. 33 of West Jordan, Utah and the
amendment thereto adding Section 9-C-8.
(R. 212.)
The subdividers in this litigation were members of
the Call

III class.

In Call

III, this Court ruled on the

subdividers' motion to certify the class on July 23, 1986.

The

petition for rehearing was denied on October 29, 1986.

The

Call v. West Jordan litigation was remanded to the trial court
on November 12, 1986.
C.

Legal Analysis.
In

Call

III, this

Court

in

denying

class

action

status to the subdividers, ruled that the subdividers who paid
money

to West Jordan would have the opportunity to litigate

their claims:
21

[W]e are here dealing with a class whose
members have been identified.
They are
developers engaged in business whose claims
are not so insubstantial that joinder or
individual suits would not merit the cost.
It is unlikely that denial of class action
status would preclude them fthe subdivid e s ] from pursuing their remedies. . .
Because of our ruling on the merits of the
case, there is no possibility of inconsistent judgments. (emphasis added.)
Call III, at 183-4.
This
correct.

Court's

Inherent

reasoning

in

Call

III

is

clearly

in a class action suit are always the

possibilities that after the statutory limitations period on
the class claims has expired, the class will not be certified
or some class members will opt out of the class to pursue their
individual claims.

In either event, the class member, whether

he seeks to enter into the original class action suit or by
filing a separate action, will seek to do so at a time when he
is technically barred by a strict application of the statute of
limitations.

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720

F.Supp. 894 (D. Utah 1989).
To

avoid

such

an unequitable

result, the

United

States Supreme Court squarely held that the commencement of a
class action, such as Call III, suspends any applicable statute
of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who
22

would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue
as a class action.

The statute of limitations is tolled for

all members of the potential class until the issue of class
certification is resolved by the courts.

Crown Cork & Seal Co.

v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983); American Pipe and Construction
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Sinclair, supra.
In the Crown Cork case, the United

States

Supreme

Court explained the rationale for the tolling:
Limitation periods are intended to put
defendants on notice of adverse claims and
to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping in
their rights. . . . [T]hese ends are met
when a class action is commenced.
Class
members who do not file suit when the
class action is pending cannot be accused
of sleeping in their rights. . . . And a
class complaint notifies the defendant not
only of the substantive claims being
brought against them, but also of the
number
and generic
identities of the
potential plaintiffs who may participate in
the judgment.
Id. at 352-53.
When

the

trial

court's

decision

on

class

action

status is appealed, the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until a final decision is made by the appellate court.
West

Haven

F.Supp.

School

1547, 1555

District

v. Owens-Corning

(D. Conn.

1988);

Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.Supp.
Barkman

v.

Wabash

Inc.,

674

Fiberglass, 721

see, Byrd

v.

Travenol

342 (N.D. Miss. 1987); c.f. ,
F.Supp.

23

623

(N.D.111.

1987)

(Statute

of

limitations

tolled

during

pendency

of

class

allegations in similar earlier actions in which no class was
ever

actually

certified);

see, Calderon v. Presidio Valley

Farmers Association, 863 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1989).
To rule otherwise would frustrate the primary purpose
of class action litigation, judicial economy.
supra; American Pipe, supra.

Crown Cork,

There would be a multitude of

suits filed at different times, in different courts, before
different judges, as each potential class member scrambles to
protect his individual claim.
This Court, in Call III, recognized that the statute
of limitations is tolled until a final decision on class action
certification is reached.

Only by doing so could the court

rule that: "It is unlikely that denial of class action status
would

preclude

remedies. . . . "

them

[the

subdividers]

from

pursuing

their

(Call III, at 183.)

In summary, a final decision on class action certification was not made until either July 23, 1986, the date of the
Call III decision, or October 29, 1986, the date the petition
for rehearing on class certification was denied.

Any appli-

cable statute of limitations was tolled until the date of the
final decision.
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POINT V
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
The purpose and object of a statute of limitations
is

to

allow

a

defendant

to

research

and

discover

facts

relevant to a lawsuit while the facts are relatively fresh.
e.g. , Collier v. City of Pasadena, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Cal.
App. 1983).
a claim.

A statute of limitations is not an absolute bar to

To prevent injustice, courts apply the "doctrine of

equitable tolling."

The doctrine is used to toll the statute

of limitations for a plaintiff pending the outcome of a similar
or related lawsuit.

For example, the United States Supreme

Court in Telegraphers v. Ry Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944)
tolled a statute of limitations during the pendency of a lengthy administrative proceeding over the same claim for wages.
Similarly, in Collier, The California Appeals Court
tolled

a

six

month

statute

of

limitations

for

filing

a

disability pension claim because other workers had filed claims
arising out of the same disabling injury.
The rationale for applying the doctrine of equitable
tolling is that the legislature "would not wish the plaintiff
deprived of his access to the courts when no policy underlying
a statute is served in doing so."
U.S. 424 (1965).
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Burnett v. New York, 380

Three elements, all of which exist in this case, must
be present to invite the doctrine of equitable tolling.

There

must be timely notice to the defendant in filing the first
claim; there must be a lack of prejudice to the defendant in
gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and
there

must

be

good

faith

and

reasonable

plaintiff in filing the subsequent claim.

conduct

by

the

Collier, supra.

In this case, there is absolutely no question that
the Call v. West Jordan claim was timely filed.

This court

ruled in favor of Call and directed judgment be entered in
Call's favor.
Further,

the

litigating the claims.

defendant

is

not

prejudiced

by

In the Call v. West Jordan litigation,

West Jordan identified the subdividers and the money and cash
paid by the subdividers.

It knew then and it knows now, the

facts upon which the subdividers claims are based.

Because the

West Jordan ordinance is void, there is no defense to the
subdividers' claim.
Finally,

See, Point VIII of this brief.
the

subdividers

reasonably in bringing their claims.

in

this

case

acted

It makes no sense for

them to file separate lawsuits against West Jordan before a
final ruling was obtained on the class action issue.
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After the

class

action

issue

was

finally

resolved,

the

subdividers

brought their claims within 12 to 26 months.
In

short,

because

no

public

policy

is

served

by

applying the statute of limitations against these subdividers,
the

doctrine

of

equitable

tolling

suspends

any

applicable

statute of limitations.
POINT VI
APPLYING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS A BAR TO THESE
SUBDIVIDED CLAIMS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS OF ACCESS
TO THE COURTS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Limitation periods are intended to put defendants on
notice

of

adverse

claims

sleeping on their rights.

and

to

prevent

plaintiffs

Crown Cork, supra at 352.

from

However,

as set forth in Point IV of this brief, tolling the statute of
limitations

pending

a

decision

on

class

action

status

related litigation, does not impair those interests.

on

However,

if this Court were to decline to toll the statute, serious
competing interests guaranteed by Article I, Section 11 of the
Utah Constitution would be impaired.
Article
part

of

the

Constitution.
1985) .

I, Section

Declaration
Berry v.

11 of the Utah Constitution
of

Rights

contained

Beech Aircraft,

It reads:
27

717 P.2d

in
670

is

Utah's
(Utah

All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him . . . shall have
remedy by due course of law, . . .
The clear language of Section 11 guarantees access to
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness
and equality.

Berry, at 675.

In Berry, the Utah
interests

of

a

products

Supreme Court

liability

statute

ruled
of

that the

repose were

outweighed by the protected interests of Article I, Section 11.
The

court

struck

down the

statute of

repose

as unconsti-

tutional .
In Berry, the interests of the statute of repose
were to provide a reasonable time within which actions may be
commenced while limiting the time to a specific period so that
insurance premiums can be calculated and to expedite the early
evaluation and settlement of claims.

Berry, at 621.

The statute of repose interests identified in Berry
are no different than the interests claimed by West Jordan,
i.e., there should be a short specific period of time to file
claims so that potential liability can be limited and so that
claims may be evaluated by an early date.
If this Court upholds the lower court's ruling that
the statute of limitations bars the subdividers' claims, it
28

will effectively re-weigh the competing interests identified in
Berry, and overrule the Berry decision to the extent it applies
to class action.
whenever

a

Open access to the courts will be meaningless

class

action

lawsuit

is

filed,

the

statute

of

limitations expires, and class action certification is denied.

POINT VII
IF THERE IS A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE
TO THE SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIMS, IT IS UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-25 (FOUR YEARS)
As
subdividers

set
do

forth

not

in

Point

concede

applies to their claims.

that

III
any

of

this

statute

brief,

of

the

limitations

However, if a statute of limitations

does apply, the applicable

statute of limitations is clearly

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (four years).
In Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership v. Salt Lake City
Suburban

Sanitary

District,

738

P.2d

633

(Utah

1987),

a

developer sued the sewer district, a governmental entity, for a
refund of sewer connection

fees.

The issue before the Utah

Supreme Court was which statute of limitations applied.

The

governmental entity like West Jordan argued that the § 7 8-1231

a

six

month

refunds, was

statute

of

limitations,

the correct statute.

applicable

to

This court rejected

tax
that

notion and held that sewer connection fees are a charge for the
29

use of the sewer and not a tax.
statute of limitations

Therefore, the applicable

is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, four

years.
In the present litigation and the underlying Call v.
West Jordan litigation, West Jordan constantly said that the
collected impact fees are an assessment for parks and flood
control.
and

There is no distinction between sewer fees and parks

flood

control

fees.

Therefore,

if

any

statute

of

limitations applies it is the four year statute set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.
to

run

until

a

final

Because the statute does not begin

decision

on class

action

status is

entered by the Court, the subdivider' actions are well within
the four years time period.

(See Point IV of this brief.)

West Jordan also argued to the trial court that the
one year statute of limitations, set forth in Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-30 bars the subdividers' claims.

West Jordan's argument

was not pled as an affirmative defense and is waived.

Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h); Tyqesen v. Magna Water
Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 395 P.2d 456 (1962).
Further, when there is a choice between two statutes
of limitations, the longer statute is applied by the courts.
Juab County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2d 49,
426 P.2d 1 (1967).
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POINT VIII
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT
FOR THE IMPACT FEES THEY PAID
A.

Introduction.
The subdividers appealed not only the trial court's

dismissal

of

their

complaint

but

also

the

trial

court's

failure to award a refund of the fees they paid under the void
ordinance.
In Call III/ this Court ruled that West Jordan's
impact fee ordinance was void ab initio and remanded the case
to enter a judgment in favor of subdividers Call and Jenkins.
Call III at 184.
The court also denied class action status to the
Call

litigation.

However,

in

so

ruling,

the

Court

acknowledged:
Because of our ruling on the merits of the
case, there is no possibility of inconsistent judgments.
Call at 183.
In summary, the Call III decision ruled that two
subdividers were entitled to the return of their money and that
if

other

subdividers

inconsistent
entitled

filed

actions,

there

would

be

no

judgments, i.e., the subdividers also would be

to the return of their

ordinance.
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fees paid under the void

Yet in this litigation, West Jordan, contrary to Call
III, demanded that the lower court enter a judgment inconsistent with the Call III ruling, i.e., no refunds for the
subdividers.
The request was made on the basis of the statute of
limitations
Jordan.

and

other

affirmative

defenses

pled

by

West

Points I-VII of this brief address the statute of

limitations issue.

The statute of limitations simply does not

bar the subdividers' claims.
Further, because West Jordan's affirmative defenses
of mistake, estoppel, waiver, laches, and unjust enrichment, as
a matter of law, are without merit and because West Jordan is
collaterally estopped

from raising the affirmative defenses

that were disposed of in the Call v. West Jordan litigation,
the subdividers are entitled to an entry of judgment for the
fees they paid under a void ordinance.
B.

Factual Background.
1.

In Call III, this court ordered the trial court

to enter a judgment

for the impact

fees paid by Call and

Jenkins because the West Jordan Ordinance was void.
2.

On remand, West Jordan amended its answer to

include the defenses of mistake, estoppel, waiver, laches, and
unjust enrichment.
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3.

Subsequently the trial court entered a judgment

in favor of subdividers Call and Jenkins for a refund of the
fees paid to West Jordan.
4.

Thereafter, the subdividers in this litigation

sued West Jordan.

They alleged that Call III ruled that the

impact fee ordiance was void and that they were entitled to a
refund of the impact fee paid to West Jordan.
5.
is void.
fees.

There is no issue that the West Jordan Ordinance

There is no issue that the subdividers paid impact

There is no issue as to the amount of the fee each

subdividers paid.
C.

Legal Analysis.
1.

Each Defense Pled by West Jordan Fails as a Matter of
Law.
a)

Mistake.

Mistake is not a defense to recovery of money paid to
a municipality.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in El

Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779
(Utah 1977):
If the city obtains the money of another by
mistake, or without authority of law, it is
her duty to refund it.
The defense of mistake in a case similar to this one
was addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court in Peterson v.
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McNichols, 260 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1953).

That case involved the

recovery of license fees paid under an ordinance later ruled as
invalid by the Colorado Supreme Court.

Addressing the City's

repayment obligation, the Court stated:
In conclusion, we emphasize that in private
business, between individuals, if money is
paid under a mistake of fact or law, the
right to the return of such money is no
where denied. A municipality is not exempt
from the same rule, and why it should seek
the application of a different rule is not
understandable.
Id. at 941.
Mistake is no defense to these subdividers' claims
for a refund.
b)

Estoppel, waiver, and laches.

The policies underlying the defenses of estoppel,
waiver and
together.

laches are similar.

Courts often address them

None is a defense to recovery of payments made under

a void ordinance.
1.

Estoppel.

Estoppel applies when one by acts, representations or
conduct, or by silence when he ought to speak, induces another
to believe certain facts exist and that other person relies
thereon to his detriment.
1980).

Leaver v. Grose, 610 P. 2d 1262 (Utah

Estoppel is not a defense to the plaintiffs' claims

here.
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The Supreme Court of Washington explained in Port of
Peninsula v. Bendiksen, 429 P.2d 859, 861 (Wash. 1967):
The doctrine of estoppel generally has no
application in cases where the assessment
is wholly or absolutely void;. . .nor will
the act or conduct of a property owner
estop him to question the validity of an
assessment where there is a total lack of
authority on the part of the municipal
governing body . . . to levy the assessment.
(Citing
63 C.J.S.
Municipal
Corporations § 1462b.)
Similarly,

the

Florida

Supreme

Court

in

City

of

Treasure Island v. Strong, 215 So.2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1968).
stated:
It seems well established that principles
of estoppel and waiver will not operate to
bar an attack against irregularities and
defects which by their nature render
assessment proceedings void, as opposed to
voidable.
These principles were summarized by the Supreme Court
of Nebraska in Cullingham v. City of Omaha, 10 N.W.2d 615, 618
(Neb.

1943):
Where special assessments against
property to pay the cost of
paving are void, knowledge of the
proceedings and of the construction of the improvement will not
estop the owner from avoiding
liability therefore, and they
[assessments] cannot be enforced
solely on the ground of the
benefits of the improvements to
the owners of abutting lots or
lands. . . . Delay of effort to
protect against a void tax or
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assessment cannot have the effect
of making vital and valid that
which had no vitality or validity
from the beginning.
Just as in Cullinqham, the West Jordan impact fee
ordinance was declared void from the beginning.

As such, the

plaintiffs "cannot be estopped from avoiding liability." That's
a cumbersome way of saying that property owners can avoid
payment under a void ordinance or, if they have already paid,
they may

have

those payments

returned

to them.

Estoppel

cannot bar such a claim.
2.

Waiver.

Waiver does not apply to a claim for recovery of
money paid under a void assessment or fee.

This was explained

by the Ohio Court of Appeals in Parente v. Day, 241 N.E.2d 280,
283 (Ohio App. 1968):
If any underlying principle can be said to
govern the waiver, or the loss by estoppel,
of the right to object to an assessment for
a street or sewer improvement, it is that a
property owner cannot ordinarily waive or
become estopped to urge the invalidity of
an assessment which is void . . . the mere
fact that the property owner failed to
object to the improvements does not work an
estoppel.
Waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of a
known right.

There can be no waiver of a right which a party

did not know existed (the right of refund of the fee payment
36

here) at the time of the alleged waiver.

Curtis Publishing

Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
3. Laches.
The purpose of laches is to prevent one who has not
been diligent in asserting a known right from recovery at the
expense of one who has been prejudiced by the delay.

The

question, however, is not whether laches does or does not bar
the action.

Laches is simply not a defense in situations

where the assessment was levied without legal authority.
McQuillin

Municipal

Corporations, §

38.191

(3d ed.

14

1987).

Where an assessment is void, the lapse of time cannot give it
life or validity.

Laches does not apply where the city lacks

jurisdiction to act from the beginning.

Cullingham, supra.

In summary, the affirmative defenses of estoppel,
waiver and laches are without legal merit and do not bar the
subdividers' claims.
c)

Unjust enrichment.

Unjust enrichment is not an affirmative defense.

It

is "the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another or
the retention of money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of equity."

66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution

and Implied Contracts § 3, at 945 (1973).
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Unjust enrichment is

closely connected to restitution and occurs when a person or
entity "retains money or benefits which in justice and equity
belong to another."

Id. at 945.

If unjust enrichment is to be raised at all in this
case, it is to be raised by the subdividers, not West Jordan.
The subdividers paid a lot of money under a void ordinance.
This

is

essentially

an

action

for

restitution

to

plaintiffs of money which should be returned to them.

the
(See

Point I of this brief.)
The unjust

enrichment

"defense" of West

Jordan is

simply another way of raising estoppel, as estoppel was raised
in Parente v. Day, 241 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ohio. App. 1968):
It is also contended . . . that appellants
are estopped from denying liability because
their property was benefited
by the
improvement, and because, knowing the work
was being prosecuted, they should have
taken action and not waited until the work
was completed.
Responding to that argument, the court stated:
.We do not think the principle of
estoppel applies in such a case.
The
council having failed to properly levy a
tax,
the appellants
[property owners]
cannot be subjected to the payment of any
part of the expense.
Id. at 285.
In
(Wash.

1967),

Port

of

Peninsula

the Washington

v.

Bendiksen,

Supreme
38

Court

429

P.2d

addressed

859

unjust

enrichment in a case similar to this case.

In Bendiksen, the

City brought an action against waterside property owners to
recover sums allegedly owed to it based on adopted tariffs.
These charges were for the use of the tidal basin, waterway,
dock and trestle.

The court held that the assessment was void

as a levy on property beyond its authority.

The City said it

should still recover on an unjust enrichment theory.

This was

based on the improvements made and the benefit to the property
owner by the facilities and improvements.

The City had spent

$23,000 on a breakwater and an additional $10,000 on repairs
and maintenance on the facilities.

The Court rejected the

City's claim to recovery for unjust enrichment.
We do not agree. We are not convinced that
the benefit accruing to respondents as a
result of the establishment of the
facilities involved in this case is an
unjust enrichment for which [the City] is
entitled to compensation from [the property
owners].
Id. at 862.
2.

West Jordan is Collaterally Estopped From Raising the
Defenses of Mistake, Estoppel, Waiver, Laches and
Unjust Enrichment.
West

Jordan

is prevented,

under

the

doctrine of

collateral estoppel (also known as issue preclusion) from now
litigating the defenses of mistake, estoppel, waiver, laches
and unjust enrichment.
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The elements of collateral estoppel are:
a)

The issue decided in the prior adjudication must
be

identical

to

the

issue

presented

in the

action in question;
b)

A final judgment on the merits;

c)

The party against whom the plea is asserted must
be

in

privity

with

a

party

in

the

prior

adjudication;
d)

The issue in the first case must be fully and
fairly litigated.

Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978).
All elements are satisfied in this case.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

explains

the

doctrine of

collateral estoppel as follows:
The established rule is that a stranger to
a judgment may assert a judgment against
one who actually litigated an issue that
was necessarily decided by the judgment and
thereby preclude the relitigation of the
same issue. Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d
1293, 1296 (Utah 1982) .
The form of the Judgment in Call v. West Jordan was
prepared and submitted by West Jordan.

Parties "must see to it

that claims disclosed by the pleadings, yet intended to be left
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open and undecided, are excluded from the judgment's binding
effect."

Peacock v. Sundre Township, 372 N.W.2d 877, 879 (N.D.

1985) •
A judgment becomes conclusive on the questions and
facts which were in issue.

An adjudication contemplates that

the claims of all parties have been considered and set at rest.
North Broward Hospital District v. Finkelstein, 456 So.2d 498,
499 (Fla. App. 1984).
Res

judicata

and

collateral

estoppel

apply

to

"matters within the issues framed by the parties or tendered by
the pleadings.
issue."

That is, matters which were distinctly put in

Sunshine Utilities Equipment, Inc. v. Treasure Coast

Utilities, 421 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. App. 1982).
West Jordan is collaterally estopped

from reliti-

gating the affirmative defenses of mistake, estoppel, waiver,
laches and unjust enrichment.

Those issues were raised in Call

v. West Jordan, by West Jordan's specific amended answer. The
judgment in Call v. West Jordan adjudicated all issues raised
in the pleadings.
be

excluded

from

West Jordan did not preserve any issues to
the

judgment's

binding

effect.

Those

affirmative defenses should be stricken as a matter of law.

41

XI.
CONCLUSION
After this Court in Call v. West Jordan, 727 P. 2d
180 (Utah 1986) ruled that West Jordan's impact fee was void,
and that the subdividers must individually proceed on their
claims, these subdividers filed their claims.

In Call III,

this Court ordered a refund of the fees collected by West
Jordan without authority.
was

no possibility

of

In Call III, this Court ruled there

subsequent

inconsistent

judgments to

subsequent claims.
No statute of limitations bars the subdividers7 claims
and even if there is an applicable statute of limitations, it
was tolled until the Call III decision.
For these reasons, judgment of the trial court must
be reversed and the trial court ordered to enter a judgment in
favor of the subdividers for the amount of the fees they paid
plus prejudgment interest.
DATED this <^3

day of July, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff Arnold
Development, Brighton Builders,
R & D Engineers & /(m^rican Tierra
Corp,

BERtt1 p.
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JUDICIAL CODE

I O-1.6-60

In action against contractors for defective
construction, the six-year limitation period of
Subsection (2) applied rather than the threeyear limitation of Subsection 78-12-26(1) because plaintiff asserted liability based entirely
on written instruments, including contracts.
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co.,
744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987).
Running of statute.
—Settlement agreement.
Under a settlement agreement, the defendant was to have sold certain property and dis-

tributea the proceeds by a certain date. Therefore, a cause of action accrued when that date
passed and the defendant had not sold the
property. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Tolling.
-Concealment or misleading.
, *T00J o f concealment or misleading by the
defendant precludes the defendant, in an action under a settlement agreement, from raising the statute of limitations defense. Butcher
v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Limitations of actions applicable
to action by trustees of employee benefit plan
to enforce delinquent employer contributions

under ERISA (29 USCS § 1132(a)), 90 A.L.R.
Fed. 374.

78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or sendees rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of
Chapter 6, Title 25, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1)0)); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted Subsec-

tion (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as
Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
p

n.

r

.

Uonfhct of laws.
Constitutionahty.
Federal civil rights actions.
Malpractice.
Open account.
Other claims for relief.
—Federal claim
Q: te j
"
Conflict of laws.
Trial court properly extended comity so as to

apply the two-year limitations provision of the
California Governmental Claims Act, rather
t h a n t h i s s e c t i o n > t 0 a complaint alleging inj u r > T s u s t a i n e ( j i n a n emergency landing of a
helicopter owned by a California governmental
entity. Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
^
... ..
,..
Constitutionality.
Subsection (3) does not violate the open
courts provision of the Utah constitution.
McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp.
835 (D. Utah 1989).

Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge, or
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by
statute, when there is substantial evidence to
support the charge and the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person would
constitute a substantial danger to self or any
other person or to the community or is likely to
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on
bail
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by law.
1989
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel p u n ishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor
1896

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him m his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal m this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend m person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
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the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof snail be as prescribed by the Legislature
1949

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable s e a r c h e s forbidden —
I s s u a n c e of w a r r a n t . ]
The right of the people to be secure m their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech a n d of the press —
Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given m evidence
to the jury* and if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the part)
shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact
1896
Sec. 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting ]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by lav
1896

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Imp a i r i n g contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or la* impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
2896

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies
or m giving them aid and comfort No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of Uo
witnesses to the same overt act
1896
Sec. 20.

[Military s u b o r d i n a t e to the civil
power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner, nor in time of war except in a manner to be
prescribed by lav>
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted shall exist within this
State

1896

1896

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictm e n t — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with

Sec. 22. [Private p r o p e r t y for public use.]
Private propertv shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.)
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably am
franchise, privilege or lmrrmmtv
»«~

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
it is not necessarily a requisite to its termmation that it decide all of the issues between the

Rule 23

adverse claimants. Terry's Sales, Inc. v.
Vander Veur, 618 P 2d 29 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader
§ 29 et seq.
C.J.S. — 48 C.J.S. Interpleader § 11.
A.L.R. — Amount of attorney's compensa-

tion in absence of contract or statute fixing
amount, 57 A.L.R 3d 475.
Key Numbers. — Interpleader «=> 14.

Rule 23. Class actions.
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole; or
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; CD) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained;
notice; judgment; actions conducted partially as class actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.

R u l e 23
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(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in an action maintained as a class acttf5n~lmder Subdivision
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in conduct of actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings
be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16,
and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 23, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Advancement, conduct, and hearing of actions, orders for, reasonable notice, Rule 78.
Antidiscrimination Act, § 34-35-1 et seq.
Appearance bv attorney, proof of authority,
§ 78-51-33.
Capacity to sue or be sued need not be
averred, Rule 9(a)(1).
Claims for relief, Rule 8(a).
Commencement of action, Rule 3.
Consolidation of actions, Rule 42(a).

Defenses; form of denials, Rule 8(b).
Dismissal of actions, Rule 41.
Fact questions decided by jury, § 78-21-2.
Form of orders, rules relating to pleadings
applicable, Rule 7(b)(4).
Intervention, Rule 24.
Joinder of claims and remedies, Rule 18.
Judgment defined, Rule 54(a).
Jurisdiction and venue unaffected by Rules,
Rule 82.
Law questions decided by court, § 78-21-3.
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties, Rule
21.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Motion to dismiss and notice of motion,
forms for, Form 20.
Necessary joinder of parties, Rule 19.
One farm of action, Rule 2.
Orders defined, Rule 7(b)(2).
Orders, enforcement of, by and against nonparties, Rule 71 A.

Rule 23

Orders, modification of, Rule 7(b)(2).
Orders, services of, Rule 5(a) to (c).
Permissive joinder of parties, Rule 20.
Venue of actions, § 78-13-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
statute, see West Point Irrigation Co. v.
Moroni & Mt. Pleasant Irrigating Ditch Co., 14
Utah 127, 46 P. 762 (1896).

ANALYSIS

Amendment of rule.
Notice.
—Derivative actions by shareholders.
—Declaratory relief.
Action by corporate shareholders alleging inPrerequisites.
jury to the corporation only, and not to them as
—"Common or general interest."
individuals, was a derivative action and could
—Derivative actions by shareholders.
not be brought as a class action. Richardson v.
—Impracticability of joinder.
——Size of class.
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980).
—Subdivision developers.
—Impracticability of joinder.
Cited.
Amendment of rule.
Size of class.
Discussion of class actions prior to 1971
Size of the class is not solely determinative
amendment of this rule. See Salt Lake City v. of impracticability of joinder. Call v. City of
Utah Lake Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).
P.2d 773 (1955).
—Subdivision developers.
Notice.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying class action status to subdivision de—Declaratory relief.
The provisions of Subdivision (c)(2) concern- velopers whose claims were not so insubstaning notice to the class are applicable only to tial that joinder or individual suits would not
class actions brought under Subdivision (b)(3), merit the cost of challenging an ordinance imand not to actions brought, such as for declara- posing an impact fee as a condition to granting
tory judgment, under Subdivision (b)(2). plat approval. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727
Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).
856 (Utah 1978).
Cited in Hansen v. Brotherhood of LocomoPrerequisites.
tive Firemen & Enginemen, 24 Utah 2d 30,
465 P.2d 351 (1970); Olson v. Salt Lake City
—"Common or general interest."
For case discussing requirements of former School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and Settlement § 11; 24 Am. Jur. 2d Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit § 15; 566
Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 29;);
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 47 et seq.
.;
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 51;
67 C.J.S. Parties § 21 et seq.
A.L.R. — Attorneys' fees in class actions, 388
A.L.R.3d 1384.
Air or water pollution, maintainability inn
state court of class action for relief against, 477
A.L.R.3d 769.
Consumer class actions based on fraud or>r
misrepresentations, 53 A.L.R.3d 534.
Appealability of order denying right to pro-)ceed in form of class action — state cases, 544
A.L.R.3d 595.
Construction of provision in compromise andd

settlement agreement for payment of costs as
part of settlement, 71 A.L.R.3d 909.
Landlord, propriety of dass action in state
courts to assert tenants* rights against, 73
A.L.R.3d 852.
Indenture trustee, propriety of state court
class action by holders of bonds against, 73
A.L.R.3d 880.
Propriety of class action in state courts to
recover taxes, 10 A.L.R.4th 655.
Absent or unnamed class members in class
action in state court as subject to discovery, 28
A.L.R.4th 986.
Propriety of attorney acting as both counsel
and class member or representative, 37
A.L.R.4th 751.
Inverse condemnation state court class actions, 49 A.L.R.4th 618.

Rule 23.1

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Class actions in state mass tort suits, 53
A.L.R.4th 1220.
Permissibility of action against a class of defendants under Rule 23(b)(2) of Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 263.
Key Numbers. — Motions «=* 51; Parties <*=>
9 to 12.

Rule 23.1. Derivative actions by shareholders.
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be
asserted by it, the complainant shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which
he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have. The
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 23.1, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Corporate stockholders or directors, limitation of action
against, § 78-12-27.
Corporation defined, Utah Const., Art. XII,
Sec. 4; § 16-10-2.

Extraordinary writs, § 78-35-6 et seq.; Rule
65B.
Liability of corporate directors, § 16-10-44.
Liquidation of corporation, action by or
against receiver, § 16-10-93.
Sue and be sued, power of corporation to,
Utah Const., Art. XII, Sec. 4; § 16-10-4(l)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrongful act.
Class action distinguished.
Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of
wrongful act.
Shareholders' action against former corporate directors and officers for alleged conversion of corporate assets and for breach of fidu-

ciary duties was barred by this rule where the
shareholders did not acquire their stock until
after the events complained of and the shares
did not devolve on them by operation of law.
Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1984).
Class action distinguished.
Action by corporate shareholders which alleged injury to the corporation only, and not to
them as individuals, was a derivative action
and could not be brought as a class action.
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d
636 (Utah 1980).

^BTia. RATING TO KsicATio/^aprr/^
SPAQ! DY SUUOIVIEOS TO IVDLIC JKE

D.

AIDING SKCTICN 9-C-B T1ERIN.

The City Council of the City of West Jordan ordains as
follows:
Section 1. That Ordinance No. 33 of the West Jordan City
ordinance relating to subdivisions be amended by a/lrllng the
following section.
Section 9-C-8 (a). In addition to all the other requirements
prescribed under this ordinance the subdivider shall be required
to dedicate seven per cent (7.0%) of the land area of the proposed
subdivision to the public use for the berveflt and use of the citizens
of the City of West Jordan and shall convey title of the same to
the City by a proper conveyance instrument, or in the alterative
at the option of the governing body of the City, the City may accept
the equivalent value of the land in cash if it deems advisable.
Section 9-C-8 (b). The monies received by the City as a result
of the requirements of Section 9-C-8 (a) hereinabove shall be used by t:
City for its flood control and/or parks and recreational facilities.
Section 2. This ordinance shall beccnae effective twenty (20)
days after its posting in three (3) public places or 30 days after
publication in a ne^vspaper of general circulation.
Section S-08 (c). In the event the City governing body elects
to receive the monies persuant to Section 9 - 0 8 (a) said monies shall
be paid by the subdivider on or before final approval of the plat is
given by the City Cbuncil.

PASSED AND ADOPTED this 21st day of January, 1975 by the City
Council of the City of West Jordan.
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November 3, 1977

Mayor and City Council
City of West Jordan
1850 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 840 84
Dear Sirs:
This office has been contacted by John Call
and his partner, Clark Jenkins, concerning the Wescall
subdivision located within the City of West Jordan, Utah.
TheTwescall SUDQIVISXOST) consists of approximately 30 acres
in.'.West Jordan legally described as:
Beginning at a point on the East right-ofway line of a road which is 33*0 fi S. 89°
31! 50" E along the section line from the
S.W. corner of Section 5,'T3S, R1W, S.L.B.&M.
and running thence N 0° 03f 4 3" W along said
right-of-wav 169.4 feet, thence S 89° 31f
50" S 186.35 feet, thence N 4° 11f 20" E
330.01 feet, thence N 24° 04' 16" E 190.33
feet, thence N 5° 32 ! 25" E 487.07 feet,
thence N 84° 37f 16" E 587.37 feet, thence
N 0° 28f 10" E 101.81 feet, thence S 89°
31 ! 50" E 365.00 feet, thence S 0 C 031 43" E
1320.00 feet, thence N 89° 31' 50" W 1287.00
feet, to point of beginning.
Mr. Call and his partner have informed me that
pursuant to Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan, Utah, and the
amendment thereto adding § 9-C-8, they were required on
July 19, 1977 to pay the amount of $16,576 to the City of
West Jordan as a condition for approval of the Wescall subdivision. A copy of the cancelled check is enclosed. Other
persons subdividing land within the City of West Jordan have
also been required to dedicate seven percent (7%) of the land
of the proposed subdivision or pay the equivalent value in
cash to the City of West Jordan in order to have their subdivision approved.

fv/,/.^

_

'-. "

Mayor and City Council
City of West Jordan
November 3, 1977
Pace Two
—

...

After extensive legal research, I have concluded
that the City of West Jordan cannot legally require subdividers
to dedicate land or pay cash for public use in the manner
prescribed by the above ordinance. The ordinance.would appear
to be invalid as a taking of property for public use. without
just compensation, or a tax not authorized by the Utah State
Legislature, or a tax in excess of the maximum tax allowed
by the Utah State Legislature.
On behalf of John Call, Clark Jenkins and all.
others similarly situated who have been required to dedicate
land or pay cash to the City of West Jordan under the above
ordinance, I hereby demand that ail such land and/or cash be
returned. If the land and/or cash is not returned within
90 days, * pursuant to § 10-7-77, Utah Code Anno., Mr.. Call'and
Mr. Jenkins have authorized this office to file a class action
lawsuit for the return of such land and/or cash.
Sincerely yours,

Vaiden P. Livingston
V?L/ehh
£nc«

/*

*

Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone
(801) 278-4439
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL, an individual,
and CLARK JENKINS, an
individual, on behalf of
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

-

CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH
Defendant.

P l a i n t ! 11 a ,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
AND OTHER RELIEF

)

Civil No.

)

Lor tliciuMcl vcti

and a l l

othei

mrmbcis

of

the class hereinafter described, allege:
1.

T h © H A m o A p ] A I nl i ffc

at©

all

recinonhc

of

f- h ©

County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
2.

The defendant is a city existinq within Salt Lake

County under the lavs of the State of Utah.
3.

This action is brought against the City of West

Jordan pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 10-7-77.

Plaintiffs request

that this action for declaratory judgment be advanced on the
calendar in accordance with Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4.

r 1 a jn I i f f c '

rlaim,

ac

nv» r ©

fully

« l o c r r | b©«^ h © r © i n ,

was present «MJ to the (%ity ot Wrst Jordan on Novnml^r 4, 1S77
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. S 10-7-77 by way of letter
doted November 3, 3 577.

As of the date of this Complaint, the

City of West Jordan )u:s been in possession of such letter for
over ninety (90) d.tys and lias refused to allow such claim to
plaintiffs.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
3.

This action is brought by plaintiffs as a class

action, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others

Rules of Civil Procedure for damages and miunct*
decla

;>ry relief, including costs and c
6.

and

.rneys' fees.

The class so represented by plaintiffs in this

action, and n r ^ u — ^ pip*"f;ffs are themselves members, consists
of all persons, partnerships, businesses, and corporations which
have, or will be required, to either dedicate seven percent
(7%) of the land area of their proposed subdivision or the
equivalent value in cash to the defendant in accordance with
Ordinance No. 33 o£ West Jordan, Utah, and the amencment
:hereto addmq Section 9-C-8.
7.

On infornujtjon and belief, the exact number of

members of the class identified and described above is not
Known, but plaint ills believe Lh.it then/ nn* in excess of
one hundred (100) members.

The class is so numerous that

joinder of individual memners herein is impracticable.
8.

There are common questions of law and fact in the

action that relate to and affect the rights of each member

of

the class, namely, whether the City of West Jordan can require
a subdivider of land to dedicate seven percent (7%) of the
land area of a proposed subdivision or to pay the equivalent
value m

cash to the City of West Jordan to be used for flood

control and/or recreation and parxs as a condition for obtaining
the city's approval of the subdivision.
9.

The claims of plaintiffs who are representatives

of tne class herein are typical of the claims of the class
in that the claim:; of all membeis of the cl.isr. , including
plaintiffs, depend on a snowing of the acts and omissions of
defendant civinc; rise to the riqht of plaintiffs to the relief
sougnt herein.

On information and belief, tnere is no conflict

as between any individual named plaintiff and other members of
tne class with respect to this action, or with respect to the

the class and are acle to, and will, fairly a^d adequately
protect the - .erests of the class.
11.

This action is properly maintained as a class

action for the following reasons:
(a)

The prosecution of separate actions by

individual members of the class would create a risk of varying
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
defendant herein, which opposes the class;
(b)

The prosecution of separate actions by

individual members of the class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications, or would
substantially impair or impede.their ability to protect their
interests;
(c)

The defendant herein, which opposes the class,

has acted or refused to act, as hereinafter more specifically
alleged, on grounds which are applicable to the class, and has
by reason of such conduct made appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
entire class as sought in this action; and
(d)

The questions of law and fact common to the

members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication

of the controversy.
COUNT I
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT WEST
JORDAN ORDINANCE NO. 23 IS INVALID
12.

Plaintiffs hereat reallege paragraphs 1 through

11 and make them a part hereof.

; percent (7%) c r the land area of their subdivision* or pay seven
| percent (7%) or the value of such subdivisions to .,ie City of West
•J Jordan as a condition for approval of plaintiffs' subdivisions by
{ such city.

The named plaintiffs in this action have paid

j|
•'. approximately Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,000.00) which was the
j; required amount of money to the City of West Jordan.
|!
J' plaintiffs • subdivision is legally described as:

The named

ii

•:
3,

*j

Beginning at a point on the East right-ofway hne'of a road which is 33.0 ft S. 89°
31'50H £ along the section line from the
S.W. corner of Section 5, T3S, R1W, SLB&M
and running thence N 0° 03' 43n W alone said
right-of-way 169.4 feet, thence S 89° 31'
50" E 186.35 feet, thence N 4° 11' 20* E
330.01 feet, thence N 24° 04' 16" E 190.33
fee-, thence N 5? 32' 25" E 487.07 feet,
thence N 84° 37' 16" E 587.37 feet, thence
N 0° 28' 10" E 101.81 feet, thence S 89°
31' 50" E 365.00 feet, thence S 0° 03' 4 3" E
1320.00 feet, thence N 89° 31' 50" W 1287.00
feet, to point of beginning.
14.

Section 57-5-3 of the Utah Code Ann. authorizes

; cities to approve subdivions of land within their bouncaries,
; but there is no statutory authority for a city to require a
subdivider to dedicate seven

percent (7%) of the land area of

a proposed subdivision or pay the equivalent value in cash to
! the city as a condition for the city's approval of such
i
»
i
, suocivision.
15.

Plaintiffs request that this court grant

declaratory judgment in accordance with Utah Code Ann. S^8-33-3
i* ,
I! ceclarinc that S 9-C-8 of Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan is

ii

i invalid, as the Utah State Legislature has net granted cities
»•
ji

i within the State cf Utah the authority to ozss

any such

il

|! ordinance. Plaintiffs also recuest that all land dedicated to
!• the City cf West Jordan and all monies paid pursuant to such
r
i;
1

i:
ii
1«

ordinance be returned to the respective plaintiffs.

x6.
15 and make
17.

? i a m t i " s hereat reallege paragraphs 1 th.^uch
^m a part hereof.
The defendant has required the named plaintiffs,

in accordance with Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan, to pay
the sum of Sixteen Thousand Dollars (§16,000.00) to the City
of West Jordan for the public purpose of flood control and/or
parks and recreation.
18.

Plaintiffs have received no compensation for such

payment, and the above taking was made without the commencement
of any action for eminent domain by the City of West Jordan.
19.

Other plaintiffs within the class have been

required to dedicate land or pay money to the City of West
Jordan under Ordinance No. 33.

No compensation has been

received by such plaintiffs for the land dedicated or payments
mace and no actions for eminent domain have been instituted
by the City of West Jordan.
20.

The actions of the defendant in requiring the

dedication cf land or payment of money as a condition for
approval of a subdivision constitute the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation, in violation
of tne Utah Const, art. I, S 22, and the U.S. Conut. amenrt. V.
21.

5y reason cf defendant's unlawful acts, plaintiffs

have been injured in the amount of the value of the land
dedicated and money paid.
COUNT III
ORDINANCE NO. 3 3 CONSTITUTES
AN INVALID TAX
22.

Plaintiffs hereat reallege paragraphs 1 through

21 and make them a part hereof.
23.

Ordinance No. 33 cf West Jordan, Utah, amounts

to a tax on subdividers and their property by a city.
24.

Under tne Utah Const, art. XIII, S 5, cities and

^n<?^

i

•

|
5

contained v

lin SI 0-S-29 of tne Utah Code Ann

Such section

J- does not lis*- subdividers as one of the businesses upon which
|j cities are authorized to assess and collect a tax,
f
I
26. The tax imposed by West Jordan is in violation

I

•| of the Utah Constitution and is invalid. The tax, being
j. seven percent (7%) of the value of the proposed subdivision,

r

,' exceeds the maximum tax allowed under Utah law of 25 mils

II
; which cities may assess and collect on property under

i;
j* S 10-10-57 of the Utah Code Ann.
;j

27.

The City of West Jordan has required plaintiffs

!' to pay an invalid tax.
>u

28.

Plaintiffs have been damaged by the acts of the

! defendant complained of herein in the amount of the value of
j' the land dedicated or money paid to the defendant under
!i

if

|. Ordinance No. 33.
jj
WHEREFORE/ plaintiffs pray for relief in this action
i.
i.

j; f o r t h e m s e l v e s and a l l o t h e r members of t h e c l a s s as
|l
1.
Under Count I for d o c l a r a t o r y iuriqmont:

follows:

it

•

(a)

That S 9-C-B of O r d i n a n c e No. 33 of

the

i!

jj City of West Jordan be declared and adjudged invalid;
*
(b) That an injunction issue from this court
t*

I. enjoining the City of West Jordan from enforcing S 9-C-8 of
(
:

Ordinance No. 33;

»,
(c) That olaintiffs have judcment aaainst and
l«
! receive from the defendant damages in the amount of the value
j

;t of all land dedicated and money paid to defendant pursuant to
§ S-C-3 cf Ordinance No. 33 plus interest at the statutory rate;
and
i

(d)

That the claintiffs receive from the defendants

I.
plaintiff*'

i;
!!
•1
[I

rofit n i n r u r r o d

in p r n * ; n c u t i nq t h i s

nri ion,

including

a

-he Court d^ems proper.
2.

Uftwer Count I I for a taking without \
(a)

t compemat ion:

That the a c t s , p r a c t i c e s and conduct of

the

defendant hereinabove described and complained of in Count I I

i
'

be adjudged i n - v i o l a t i o n of t h e laws of Utah;

i

(b)

That an i n j u n c t i o n i s s u e from t h i s

court
i

j enjoining the defendant from enforcing S 9-C-8 of Ordinance
No, 33 of the City of West Jordan;
(c)

That plaintiffs have judgment against and

I
;

receive from defendants damages in the amount of the value
«
of all land dedicated and money paid to the defendant under

j

S 9-C-8 of Ordinance No. 33 of the Citv of West Jordan, plus

i

interest at the statutory rate; and
!
(d) That the plaintiffs receive from the defendant J
!
1
plaintiffs'
incurred
in and
prosecuting
this
:
a reasonablecosts
attorneys
fee,
such other
andaction,
furtherincluding
relief
as the court deems proper.
DATED this

"7

day of February, 19 78.

VALDEN ?. LIVINGSTON
{J
ROBERT J. DEBRY
Attomevs for Plaintiffs
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 2 7 6-4 4 39
Plaintiffs' Address:
505 South Main
3ountiful, Utah
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John CALL and Clark Jenkins,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 19186.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 23, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1986.
Subdividers brought action to challenge validity of ordinance adopted by city
which required subdividers to dedicate 7%
of proposed subdivision land to city or to
pay equivalent of that value in cash to be
used for flood control and/or park and
recreation facilities. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David K. Winder,
J., upheld ordinance and subdividers appealed. The Supreme Court, 606 P.2d 217,
affirmed and remanded. On rehearing, the
Supreme Court, 614 P.2d 1257, upheld facial constitutionally of ordinance and remanded with instructions. On remand, the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J., entered judgment in favor
of city and subdividers appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Howe, J., held
that city planning and zoning commission
failed to comply with statutory requirements of public hearing prior to adoption of
impact fee ordinance where advance notice
to public was not provided, ordinance being
considered had not yet been drafted, and
public did not have opportunity to voice
their views.
Remanded with instructions.
Stewart, J., dissented.
1. Appeal and Error <s=>1201(3)
District court did not abuse its discretion in allowing developers to amend complaint after remand, where issues in
amended complaint were not specifically

2. Zoning and Planning <£=*134, 135
City planning and zoning commission
failed to comply with statutory requirements of public hearing prior to adoption of
impact fee ordinance where advance notice
of purpose of meeting was not provided to
public, ordinance in issue had not yet been
drafted, and public did not have opportunity to express their views; it was not sufficient that ordinance was adopted at regularly scheduled city council meeting. U.C.
A.1953, 10-9-1 to 10-9-30.
3. Parties <£=*9, 11
District court did not abuse its discretion in denying class action status to developers challenging impact fee ordinance,
where proposed class members were identifiable, where each claim would require individual consideration by court regardless of
class status, and where there was no possibility that inconsistent judgments would be
issued if individual claims were brought.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 23.

Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan City
Atty., West Jordan, for defendant and respondent.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiffs, John Call and Clark Jenkins,
appeal from the trial court's dismissal of
their complaint and the entry of judgment
in favor of defendant, City of West Jordan.
In 1974, West Jordan formulated a plan
to expand its flood control and public park
systems to meet the increasing needs of
the growing city. As part of its plan, West
Jordan decided to impose an impact fee as
a condition to granting plat approval to
subdivision developers. The fee was seven
percent of the land in the subdivision or, at
the option of the city, the equivalent value
in cash. West Jordan, Utah, Ordinance 33,
§ 9-0-8(2) (1975). Plaintiffs Daid £HP fpp*

CALL v. CITY OF WEST JORDAN
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We have issued two previous opinions in
this case. In our first opinion, Call v. City
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979)
{Call I), we held that U.C.A., 1953,
§§ 10-9-1 to -30 empowered West Jordan
to exact an impact fee to provide for flood
control and parks as a condition to granting plat approval. On rehearing, in Call v.
City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257
(1980) (Call II), we upheld the facial constitutionality of the ordinance, but we remanded to give plaintiffs an "opportunity
to present evidence to show that the dedication required of them had no reasonable
relationship to the needs for flood control
or parks and recreation facilities created by
their subdivision, if any." Id. at 1259.
[1] On'remand, the trial court allowed
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a claim that the ordinance was invalid
because West Jordan had not followed statutory requirements in enacting it. Although West Jordan does not cross-appeal
the allowance of the amendment, it urges
this Court to limit the case to the constitutional "reasonableness" issue. However,
the pleadings may be amended after remand within the sound discretion of the
trial court so long as they do not cover
issues specifically foreclosed by the appellate court. Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, 113 Utah 60,
191 P.2d 153 (1948), Utah R.Civ.P. 15; see
White v. Lobdell, 196 Mont. 156, 638 P.2d
1057 (1982); Diversified Capitol Corp. v.
City of North Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 15, 590
P.2d 146 (1979). The trial court allowed
West Jordan to argue why the pleadings
should not be amended; but after consideration, allowed the amendment. Neither
Call I nor Call II specifically addressed
this issue, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allowing the amendment. Therefore, the issue of whether
West Jordan had followed statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance was
properly before the trial court.
Because of problems encountered by the
plaintiffs in its discovery of information in

Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899
(Utah 1981), the trial court issued a pretrial
order which placed on West Jordan the
burden of producing evidence on several
issues. These issues may be condensed
into two main issues: (1) the reasonableness of the impact fee as applied to plaintiffs, and (2) whether the ordinance had
been adopted according to statutory requirements.
It is necessary in this opinion to treat
only the second issue. West Jordan was
required at the threshold to present prima
facie evidence that the city had followed
the statutory requirements contained in
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 10-9-1 to -30 in enacting
the ordinance. Within section 25, the legislature has set forth specific procedures
that a municipality must follow to exercise
the powers granted to it:
In exercising the powers granted to it by
the act, the planning commission shall
prepare regulations governing the subdivision of land within the municipality. A
public hearing thereon shall be held by
the legislative body, after which the legislative body may adopt said regulations
for the municipality.
The trial judge held in his conclusions of
law that the ordinance was validly promulgated and that "[i]t was not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the city
failed to comply with the provisions of section 10-9-25, Utah Code Annotated, in the
promulgation of the ordinance." This conclusion was supported by the court's finding of fact No. 22:
Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance,
the governing body of the City conducted
a public hearing in which an overall master plan for the development of the city
was discussed. This hearing (held in August 1974) was conducted in the West
Jordan school auditorium so as to accommodate the large number of citizens in
attendance. The specific concept of
flood control and having an impact fee
paid by new developers was discussed at
that public hearing. The Ordinance was
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City Attorney was responsible for the
selection of the actual language used in
the text of the Ordinance. The plaintiffs
submitted no evidence to show that a
public hearing was not held or that the
Planning and Zoning Commission did not
prepare the Ordinance.
We need not rule on the accuracy of this
finding to resolve the issues presented in
this case. Nevertheless, we are free to
substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court on the issue of law as to whether these facts satisfy the requirements of
section 10-9-25. Olwell i\ Clark, 658 P.2d
585 (Utah 1982), Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts,
Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). As mentioned above, the pretrial order placed upon
West Jordan the burden of making a prima
facie showing that it had satisfied the requirements of section 10-9-25. We hold as
a matter of law that it failed to carry this
burden.
Some months prior to the August 1974
public hearing, the West Jordan Planning
and Zoning Commission had discussed on
numerous occasions the idea of requiring
developers to dedicate a portion of their
subdivision or to pay an equivalent value in
cash for parks and flood control. In fact,
on March 20,1974, the Commission adopted
a motion to have the city require five percent from subdividers to use for parks. A
month later, after the Commission had exacted the five percent fee from at least one
subdivider, the city planner told the Commission that the city had no legal basis to
impose the fee. During this time, a special
committee was preparing the West Jordan
Master Plan. The master plan speaks only
in general terms about the need for parks
and recreational facilities. It also addresses in vague terms who should pay for
capital improvements to the city, hinting
that incoming residents should pay more
than existing residents because "equity in
community improvements are [sic] seldom
fairly shared through taxation." Nothing
in the master plan proposes that developers
either dedicate seven percent of their subdi,r;~;~—

—

^

-

'

•

West Jordan asserts, however, that the
"specific concept of flood control and having an impact fee paid by new developers
was discussed" at the public hearing on the
master plan. The minutes of the public
hearing were not introduced as an exhibit,
nor are they included in the record. However, one of the witnesses for West Jordan
testified as to what was in the minutes:
[Mr. Moosman:] [T]he minutes reflect
that Mrs. Schmidt asked [the city planner] concerning what was going on
with the flood control problems. And
perhaps I could read that. It would be
quicker.
[The Court] ... Go ahead and read the
pertinent parts. What does Mrs.
Schmidt say?
A. [The witness:] She asked [the city
planner] to tell what the County Flood
Control had in mind for developers in
the—
Q. Yeah. Go ahead.
A. [The city planner] then explained
that each developer must take care of
his own flood water that originates on
his property. They have suggested
catch basins that can be used both for
flood control and recreational use
It is to be observed that an impact fee was
not mentioned. In January 1975, four
months after the master plan public hearing, the city council enacted the ordinance
which imposed the seven percent impact
fee. No evidence of any other public hearing remotely related to the ordinance appears in the record.
[2] One's
imagination
must be
stretched beyond rational limits to accept
the master plan public hearing as satisfying the public hearing requirement of section 10-9-25. The ordinance was not even
drafted until months after the master plan
public hearing. Section 10-9-25 is very
clear in this respect. The Commission
must first prepare the regulations, one of
which would provide for the impact fee.
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legislative body may adopt said regulations
for the municipality. In requiring a public
hearing, our legislature contemplated that
interested parties would have an opportunity to give their views, pro and con, regarding a specific legislative proposal, and
thereby aid the municipal government in
making its land use decisions. See generally 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 4.11 (2d ed. 1976); 8A E. McQuillin,
The Law of Municipal
Corporations
§ 25.251 (rev. 3d ed., 1976).

One further matter must be addressed.
Plaintiffs urge that we reverse the trial
judge's findings denying class action status
to this lawsuit. We will reverse a trial
court's decision on class action status only *
when it is shown that the trial court misapplied the law or abused its discretion.
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen,
436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir.1970); 3B J. Moore
& J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice
§ 23.97 (2d ed. 1985); 2 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 7.39 (2d ed. 1985).
In the history of this lawsuit, plaintiffs
requested class action certification on three
different occasions from three different trial judges. All three denied their requests.
Plaintiffs do not assert that the trial court
misapplied the law in denying class action
status. Thus, we shall review the trial
court's decision to determine whether it
abused its discretion.

West Jordan also argues that because
the ordinance was adopted at a regularly
scheduled city council meeting which was
open to the public, the public hearing requirement was satisfied. Although the
statute does not specifically address the
required notice, we hold that because the
statute calls for a public hearing our legislature contemplated something more than a
regular city council meeting held, so far as
[3] The trial court found that the "putathe record here discloses, without specific
tive
class is not so numerous that joinder of
advance notice to the public that the proposed ordinance would be considered. See all parties is impracticable." Plaintiffs as1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning sert that the size of the class alone man§ 4.11 (2d ed. 1976). Notice, to be effec- dates that joinder is impracticable. Howtive, must alert the public to the nature and ever, size of the class is not solely determiscope of the ordinance that is finally native of impracticability. We acknowladopted. Id. at 200. Failure to strictly edge that there may be instances where
follow the statutory requirements in enact- sheer size alone would determine impractiing the ordinance renders it invalid. Mel- cability. One of the salutary effects of
ville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 Rule 23, Utah R.Civ.P., is that it allows
(Utah 1975); Anderson at 199. This well access to the courts for numerous claimestablished rule is followed by the great ants to request redness of claims that are
majority of jurisdictions. Annot, 96 A.L. too small to merit the expenses of litigation
R.2d 449 (1964); see Town of Beverly on an individual basis. 1 H. Newberg,
Shores Plan Commission v. Enright, 463 Newberg on Class Actions § 3.03 n. 38,
N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1984) (statute required mu- § 3.06 at 145 (2d ed. 1985). In other innicipality to publish two notices in newspa- stances, the size and membership of the
per within ten days of hearing—ordinance class may be unknown, which makes joininvalidated where first notice appeared in der impracticable. However, we are here
newspaper eleven days before hearing); dealing with a class whose members have
Kalakowski v. Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 431 been identified. They are developers enA.2d 478 (1981); Morland Development gaged in business whose claims are not so
Co. v. Tulsa, 596 P.2d 1255 (Okla.1979) insubstantial that joinder or individual suits
(city ordinance establishing flood control would not merit the cost. It is unlikely
districts invalidated because of failure to that denial of class action status would
follow statutory requirements). We there- preclude them from pursuing their remefore hold that the West Jordan, Utah, Ordi- dies. See 1 Newbero at 145. Judicial ecnn-
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would still need to be determined on an
individual basis, regardless of class action
status. Because of our ruling on the merits of the case, there is no possibility of
inconsistent judgments and no issue of substantial public interest remains. Given the
facts of this case, we cannot hold that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying
class action status.
We remand this case to the trial court to
enter judgment consistent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiffs.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., dissents.

Gustav E. CLAUS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,

1. Divorce <s>252.2, 253(4)
Division of marital property was eminently fair in awarding approximately
equal equities despite court not finding values of parties' premarital assets and increase in those values after date of marriage.
2. Divorce <e=>252.4
In dividing marital property, making
Internal Revenue Service obligation separate debt of husband was not abuse of
discretion in light of joint income tax returns disclosing that wife's income was
minimal at best.
3. Divorce <s=>215
Award of one year of temporary alimony in amount of $350 per month was not
abuse of discretion in view of wife's inability to maintain real estate license or
manage parties' rental properties during
separation due to pendency of divorce.
J. Richard Bell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
George H. Searle, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.

v.
Marlise CLAUS, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 20021.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 1, 1986.

Divorce decree dividing marital property was entered by the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., and
husband appealed. The Supreme Court
held that: (1) division of marital property
was eminently fair; (2) making Internal
Revenue Service obligation into husband's
separate debt was not abuse of discretion;
and (3) award of temporary alimony to wife
was not abuse of discretion in view of her
inability to earn income during parties' separation.

PER CURIAM:
In this divorce action, plaintiff appeals
from that portion of the decree dealing
with the distribution of the parties' marital
estate and the award of temporary alimony
to defendant. We affirm.
The parties were married four and onehalf years before they separated. No children were born of the marriage. Both had
been married before and had brought several pieces of real property into the marriage. The trial court awarded plaintiff all
the assets of his two corporations, real
property owned by those corporations, and
a rental unit acquired by the parties during
the marriage. Defendant was awarded the
home she lived in at the time of the divorce,
real property the parties had acquired with
proceeds from her real property holdings,
and property acquired bv the Darties under
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STEPHEN G HOMER
(1536)
West Jordan C i t y A t t o r n e y
P 0 Box 428
West J o r d a n , Utah 84084
Telephone 561-1463
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN TIERRA CORPORATION et al,
ORDER, RULING AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil

vs
THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant

The C o u r t ,

having

of

the

C
C
C
C
C

87-7679
87-7680
87-7681
87-7682
88-4700

[Cases assigned t o Judge Pat B r i a n ]

r e a d t h e Memoranda o f Law s u b m i t t e d by Counsel and on

February 2 1 , 1990, h a v i n g h e a r d o r a l
apprised

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

issues,

a r g u m e n t on t h e m a t t e r

now e n t e r s

the

following

and b e i n g

Findings

of

Fact

fully
and

Conclusions o f Law:
1.

The i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s

f a i l e d t o f i l e a " n o t i c e of claim" w i t h i n 90

days a f t e r t h e i r causes of action arose.
2.

The i n d i v i d u a l

Plaintiffs

f a i l e d t o f i l e t h e i r l i t i g a t i o n w i t h i n the

one year " s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n " period a f t e r t h e i r cause of action arose.
3.

The d o c t r i n e o f " e q u i t a b l e t o l l i n g " has n o t been adopted by t h e S t a t e

o f Utah.
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s

o f F a c t and Conclusions o f Law, IT IS

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion f o r P a r t i a l Summary Judgment i s g r a n t e d . The c l a i m s

o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s are b a r r e d by ( 1 ) s t a t u t e s

of l i m i t a t i o n

and ( 2 )

t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s t o comply with the " n o t i c e of claim 11
statutes.
2.

Plaintiffs1

Cross-Motion

for

Summary Judgment to s t r i k e Defendant's

for

Summary Judgment t o s t r i k e Defendant's

a f f i r m a t i v e defenses i s denied.
3.

Plaintiffs1

Cross-Motion

" s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s " defenses i s denied.
4.

Counsel

f o r t h e Defendant

w r i t t e n order r e f l e c t i n g t h i s r u l i n g

is directed
and j u d g m e n t

to prepare the
and s u b m i t

appropriate

t h e same t o t h e

Court n o t l a t e r t h a n March 2 , 1990.
The C l e r k

of the Court

three-day j u r y t r i a l
Entered t h i s

i s d i r e c t e d t o s t r i k e from t h e t r i a l calendar t h e

i n t h i s c a s e , scheduled t o b e g i n on March 2 6 t h .

X

da

Y of March, 1990.

PAT B BRIAN
Judge o f t h e D i s t r i c t

Court
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